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PART I. DOES INDEPENDENCE MATTER?
 THE CASE OF THE COLOMBIAN CENTRAL BANK
1
Abstract
Why has Colombia been a case of low output variability and moderate-to-high inflation? This
paper argues that regardless of the institutional arrangement, monetary authorities have
stabilized the business cycle, and inflation control has not been the only objective of monetary
policy. The government-controlled Junta Monetaria (1963-1991) often ignored the advice of
the Asesores, an anti-inflation group of technocrats who had no voting powers. Since 1991 the
independent and powerful members of  Junta  Directiva (1991-) are engaged in inflation
targeting but continue to place weight on output and employment stabilization in their objective
function. The institutional reform has implied a slow reduction in inflation. For a faster decline,
the current system requires either greater accountability (for not meeting the inflation targets) or
less weight on output stabilization.
                                               
1 This paper is part of a regional research project sponsored by the InterAmerican Development Bank. We would like to thank
Barry Eichengreen, Janet Kelly, Roberto Steiner, Leonardo Villar as well as other participants at seminars organized by the IDB
and Fedesarrollo. The usual caveat applies.2
1 INTRODUCTION
Colombia is known for its remarkable macroeconomic stability. Several authors have
shown that the amplitude of the Colombian business cycle has been lower than in other nations.
A number of studies have argued that the institutional design of the country, especially in
relation to fiscal policy, has played a major role in explaining that outcome. For example,
Cárdenas (1992) argues that the relative stability is the result of well designed counter-cyclical
fiscal policies
2. In turn,  Hommes (1996) examines the evolution and rationality of budget
institutions in Colombia since the middle of the 19th century. The conclusion is that the
Minister of Finance has been at center-stage in budget matters, with considerably more power
relative to other cabinet members in this regard. The arrangement has led to sound
macroeconomic performance and to the satisfaction and support of the private sector.
Along similar lines, Urrutia (1996) points out that traditionally the Minister of Finance
has not been a politician, but almost always a professional economist. This has been possible
because of the highly competitive nature of Colombian democracy. Consensus over economic
policies has arisen because politicians would rather have a technocrat occupy this ministry than
a potential rival, due to the immense power associated with this position
3. A similar scenario
takes place in the National Planning Department, an institution that has substantial influence
over the budget
4. In sum, the literature has emphasized that the low variability in output typical
of the Colombian economy has been the result of well designed fiscal policies, which arise from
adequate budgetary institutions. However, as discussed in Cárdenas and Partow (1998) this
stability is now threatened as the number of powerful interest groups in the economy expands.
This is arguably what has occurred in Colombia with the gradual decline in the importance of
coffee to the economy, making the achievement of consensus more difficult (see Junguito,
1996).
The Colombian economy is also known for its long-lasting, moderate and stable
inflation. In fact, inflation rates have been in the 20 to 30% range during the past 25 years.
Focusing on monetary institutions, and the policies that emerge from the different arrangements,
this paper explores the reasons for greater success in regard to output variability relative to
inflation control. Legal innovations with respect to the structure and mandate of the monetary
authority have been enacted over the years. The paper concentrates on the most recent change in
the institutional arrangement, from a high degree of government control during the Monetary
Board (Junta  Monetaria) years (1963-1991) to the current independent status of the  Junta
Directiva del Banco de la República granted by the 1991 constitutional reform.
The changes introduced in the new constitution were, in a formal sense, far-reaching.
First, a clearer and narrower mandate was adopted, with provisions for conflict resolution that
favor inflation control. Second, the government’s influence on the composition and naming of
                                               
2 In particular, Cárdenas (1994) points out that the incentive structure of the National Coffee Fund (NCF) is essential for
understanding the determination of domestic coffee prices (a key variable behind private consumption) and, more generally, of
the public sector deficit.
3 See, also, Meisel (1996a).
4 This experience reaffirms the results of Alesina, Hausmann, Hommes and Stein (1995). Based on an empirical exercise with
data for 20 Latin-American countries they found that greater transparency and hierarchy within budgetary institutions lead to a
better fiscal performance.3
the  Junta was diminished, making board members less vulnerable to political vicissitudes.
Third, conditions for Bank lending to the government were severely restricted. Also, the fact
that the independence of the Central Bank is consecrated in the Constitution imbues the decision
with certain weightiness. Constitutional reform is a far more cumbersome process than a change
or abrogation of a law, making it more difficult to alter the new status of the Bank.
In one of the few studies on the subject, Escobar (1996) found that during the period of
government control over monetary policy (1963-1991), money growth in Colombia was higher
(on average) than during periods of central bank autonomy. In the same spirit, this paper
measures the degree of legal and formal central bank independence and its consequences for
monetary policy. From a theoretical viewpoint, it is well known that central bank independence
is not a sufficient condition for inflation control. In the approach of Rogoff (1985), the central
banker has to be concerned about reputation or, alternatively, has to be more conservative than
society as whole in the sense of weighting inflation deviations more heavily than in the social
welfare function. In the principal-agent approach of Walsh (1995) and Persson and Tabellini
(1993), imposing pecuniary costs on central bankers when inflation deviates from the target
level solves the inflationary-bias problem. In New Zealand, the Reserve Bank Governor’s job is
at risk if inflation is higher than 3 percent per year or lower than 0. In the U.K. the Chancellor of
the Exchequer recently announced that if inflation is 1 percentage point higher or lower than the
inflation target, the Governor of the Bank of England should explain in a public letter why the
divergence has occurred and what steps will be taken in response.
5
In sum, formal central bank independence should lead to lower inflation when the
central banker genuinely has a greater dislike of inflation than society in general or,
alternatively, when contracts penalize central bankers that do not meet the inflation targets. In
the conservative-central-banker approach, the central bank has independence in setting the
inflation goal, as well as in the instruments used to pursue it. The central banker in the principal-
agent approach is given well-defined goals as well as complete control over the instruments to
achieve them, and is held accountable for the outcome. Accountability is necessary to set the
proper incentives for the central bank to meet its goals and to provide political control over a
powerful institution.
This paper analyzes whether formal changes in the degree of central bank independence
in Colombia have affected the performance of the institution relative to its objective function.
Our methodology emphasizes the instances of conflict between the goals of output and
employment stabilization  vis-à-vis inflation. The conflict resolution provides valuable
information to infer the preferences of the members of the board as well as on the costs of not
meeting the inflation targets. We do this by discussing in detail the monetary policy decision-
making process. In addition, we perform some empirical exercises in order to assess the nature
of monetary policy in Colombia. In particular, we analyze the type of monetary policy
implemented during the peaks and troughs of the business cycle.
The paper is structured in five sections. Section 2 discusses the legal changes regarding
the mandate of the central bank, as well as on the government’s influence on the composition
                                               
5 See Fischer (1995). In the case of the U.K., as well as in Canada, the penalty for excess inflation can be interpreted as the loss
of reputation.4
and naming of the Board, and the conditions for Bank lending to the Government. This section
also presents a measure of the degree of independence along the lines suggested by Cukierman
et al. (1992). Section 3 deals with the political process behind the origins of an independent
central bank in Colombia. Section 4 explores the degree of real autonomy by looking at the
minutes of the meetings of the Junta Monetaria. The analysis focuses on the resolution of
conflicts within the monetary authorities and the nature of monetary policy. In addition, some
empirical evidence on the counter-cyclical character of monetary policy, and the influence of
political and institutional factors is also presented. The paper ends in Section 5 with some
conclusions.
2 FORMAL CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE IN COLOMBIA
The Banco de la República (created in 1923) is the second oldest central bank in Latin
America
6. Over the past 64 years, it has undergone a number of important changes in its
autonomy with respect to the central Government: from a private, independent bank, to a state-
run "dependent" monetary authority, and most recently, to a public, independent Central Bank.
Until 1963, the Bank was a private and independent entity, although not always with a clear
mandate regarding price stability. In particular, in 1951, the objective of working towards
accelerating the growth of the economy was introduced, and until quite recently enjoyed at least
equal importance to the goal of price stability.
7
The Junta Monetaria was created in 1963 as the country’s monetary, foreign exchange
and credit authority, without, however, any provisions for its independence from the
Government. At the time, there was growing awareness of the inherent contradictions, in terms
of conflicts of interest, of a situation where an essentially private Bank enjoyed significant
influence over national economic policy. The decision was made to separate the  design of
monetary policy, as well as the issuing of economic regulation, in the hands of the Junta, from
the implementation of those regulations by the Bank
8. As mentioned in the introduction, the
1991 constitutional reform enhanced the degree of central bank independence in Colombia. The
main formal changes affected the clarity of mandate, the composition of the board of directors,
and the conditions for bank lending to the government.
i.  Clarity of Mandate
The granting of independence to the Banco de la República was associated with a clear
change in the institution’s objectives.  Prior to the constitutional reform the responsibilities of
the Monetary Authority explicitly included a broad spectrum of macroeconomic issues. In
addition to the control of inflation, monetary authorities pursued employment and output
stability. With the new constitution, the weights allocated to these objectives have undergone a
shift. The Board of the new Bank continues in its role as the country’s monetary, exchange and
credit authority; however, the overriding legal objective of the Banco de la República is now
                                               
6 Peru’s central bank was created in 1922.
7 Meisel (1996b) discusses the Colombian historical experience in regard to central bank independence.
8 With the nationalization in 1973 of the Bank’s capital and its transformation into a public institution, the practical reasons for a
division between the Bank and the Monetary Board disappeared. It was only until 1991, however, that the legal framework of
the two institutions was rationalized by eliminating the separation between the two bodies.5
inflation control. Moreover, and strengthening this mandate, is the provision that in situations of
a conflict of interest between the Government and the Bank, the objective of inflation control
must take precedence.
9
ii.  Composition of the Board of Directors
A central criticism of the old Junta Monetaria was its composition. As we will show,
with three cabinet ministers on the Board (Finance, Agriculture, and Development) as well as
the Director of the National Planning Department, the demands on the Board for financing of
Government programs and stabilizing employment, particularly by the sectoral ministers, were
many
10. In addition, two Asesores attended, without voting rights. Despite their generally high
technical attributes, the advisors did not have enough power within the Junta Monetaria.
Table 1 displays the list of  advisors to the Junta Monetaria. As can be seen, many of
them came from the ranks of the central bank and held Ph.D. degrees. The evidence gathered in
this paper is suggestive of the fact that the advisors were more willing to fight inflation than the
government. In this sense, we will characterize the Junta Monetaria as an arrangement where
the conservative-central-banker was not granted enough power and independence to carry out
policies.
The new Junta del Banco de la República includes the Minister of Finance, who is its
Chairman, along with the Managing Director of the Bank and five members appointed by the
President for a fixed term of four years. The Board elects the Bank’s Managing Director
11. An
innovation in the Constitution was the legal requirement that the five appointed members have a
full-time dedication to their posts, and that they not represent any particular sector of the
economy. The independence of the Board was further bolstered with the provision that each
President could name two members of the Board during his term in office (apart from the
Minister of Finance).
This is a significant improvement relative to conditions prior to the Constitutional
reform. However, the ability to name two of its members, in addition to the Minister of Finance,
means that the President may have a direct influence on three of the seven votes on the Board. If
conditions permit, as happened in 1995-96, when one of the Directors resigned before the end of
her term, thus allowing the President to appoint another member, this influence may be even
greater. As for the length of tenure of the Directors, although it is fixed to four years and is
renewable, it suffers from the provision that the new President can remove any two of the five
Directors named by his predecessor. This in effect introduces a high degree of uncertainty of
tenure for all Directors, leading to the possibility of government’s capture of those willing to be
reappointed.
                                               
9In relation to the Bank’s mandate, a new provision in the Constitution is one that calls for Board decisions to be made in
coordination with general macroeconomic policy.  It is arguable that this provision dilutes the clarity of mandate; this point will
be addressed below.
10 Other members were the Managing Director of the Bank, the Director of Incomex (Instituto de Comercio Exterior or Foreign
Trade Institute), and the Banking Superintendent. The latter, as well as the Economic Secretary of the President were invited
and non-voting members.
11 The salaries of the members of the board are set by the President of the Republic. The remaining employees of the central
bank follow the Codigo Sustantivo del Trabajo, as any private employee.6
Table 1
Regulation Institution Country
General Regulation Parliament All Countries
Specific Regulation
Financial Central Bank All Countries
Institutional Parliament All Countries
Prudential Parliament Ecuador
Government Colombia
Superintendency of Banks Chile, Peru
Parliament and SB Venezuela
Central Bank Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay
Parliament and Central Bank Uruguay
Collegial Institution Brazil, Mexico
In addition to the guidelines specified in the Constitution regarding the naming of Board
members, a number of further  disqualifications were also included in Law 31 of 1992
12.
According to the law, persons who during the previous year had acted as legal representatives of
a supervised institution in the financial sector or those who have close relatives amongst other
members of the Board or in the Boards of credit-granting institutions are barred from
membership in the Bank’s Board. Members cannot engage in party politics or in the
representation of any supervised institution, and during one year following their tenure, they are
prohibited from any form of employment in the financial sector or in the Government.
13
Table 2 displays the list of members of the new Junta, as well as some of their previous
positions. The appointment of members of the Junta del Banco de la República has become a
critical issue for Colombian economic policy. The information is illustrative because it shows
that Presidents have chosen individuals with rich and varied exposure to the public sector, often
as ministers or vice-ministers. A few of them have been presidents of business associations or
directors of Fedesarrollo. It is hard to judge from this information whether the preferences of the
directors match the conservative-central-banker type. However, according to the information
                                               
12 This is an ordinary law (i.e. there are no special requirements for its abrogation).
13 Other restrictions exist, including those dealing with national origin, professional experience and qualifications, criminal
records and so on.7
contained in Tables 1 and 2, the profiles of the members of the independent Junta Directiva and
the Advisors of the government-controlled Junta Monetaria are somewhat different in the sense
that the former have more exposure to high-ranking positions within the Executive.
Table 2
Type of Supervisory Agency Country
   Mixed Panama
   Public
Collegial Mexico
Shared United States
Individual Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and
Venezuela
   Central Bank Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay
This is an endogenous selection in a country that emphasizes the benefits of output and
employment stability. As mentioned before, the lack of voting rights of the Asesores allowed
the authorities to appoint a group of advisors less inclined to compromise, and committed to
inflation control. The flaw of the arrangement was that their advice was frequently ignored.
With the powers granted to the independent  Junta  Directiva, and the weak form of
accountability established in the Colombian legislation, the appointment of members of the
board has been a delicate issue.
iii.  Restrictions on Government Financing
Strict limitations to lending by the Central Bank to the public sector enhance autonomy
and independence in order to pursue the objective of price stability. As mentioned above, during
the Junta Monetaria days there were few restrictions to Government financing. A consensus
regarding the problems associated with this practice was a major impetus for the move to grant
independence. After the constitutional reform, however, government’s financing can now only
be undertaken subject to a unanimous vote of the Board, signaling that this is no longer a
routine procedure, but rather one that is to be viewed as a final recourse under exceptional
circumstances. Other decisions require only a simple majority (four favorable votes, out of
seven). Financing of the private sector is prohibited.
In addition to the above-mentioned changes, the Constitution granted the Bank powers
in a number of other areas considered crucial to firmly establishing its autonomy. The new Bank
is an administratively autonomous entity, free to design and execute economic policies in the
areas under its responsibility, although it is under the obligation to coordinate its regulations and
actions with other economic authorities. Financial autonomy implies that the Bank can dispose
of its own assets as it sees fit, investing and using profits according to what the law prescribes.
The Bank, of course, continues to enjoy some of the same functions as it did prior to the8
Constitutional reform, namely, its status as the sole issuer of money, bank of banks, lender of
last resort, administrator of international reserves, as well as fiscal agent for the Government.
Importantly, it lost its function as a development bank, an activity that had been widely




There are now clear-cut provisions regarding budgetary procedures. The Board, must
approve the budget of the Central Bank (which requires a non-binding concept from the
Government). The law establishes the mechanism for payment of the losses by the central
government, or the transfer of profits.
v.  Accountability
One key issue in relation to central bank independence is the system of checks and
balances that the legislation places on an institution that wields so much power. Since central
bankers are not infallible it is critical to exercise some form of control, especially in an
institution that normally operates under secrecy
15. In Colombia, according to the 1991
Constitution, the President of the Republic is responsible for the supervision of the central bank
while Congress exercises its political control. The central bank is required by law to report to
Congress twice a year, at the beginning of regular sessions. In addition, when called, members
of the Junta must attend meetings of the different Congressional Committees
16. However,
Congress does not have veto power over the members of the Junta. The Comptroller General
does not oversee the Bank. Rather, a special auditor and the Superintendency of Banks play that
role. The Attorney General has the power to investigate any member of the staff on disciplinary
grounds.
Although the law requires the central bank to set an inflation target for each year that
must be lower than the one for the previous year, there are, however, no provisions for sanctions
if those targets are not met. In this way, the conceptual framework for the Colombian central
bank is more in line with the conservative-central-banker approach, rather than the principal-
agent model that penalizes central banks that do not meet their targets. Clearly, this fact
reinforces the importance of appointing members with low tolerance for inflation.
vi.  Summary: Measuring the Degree of Independence
We attempt to quantify the degree of Central Bank independence by updating the index
constructed by  Cukierman et al. (1992) to cover the post-constitutional reform period. In
addition to being a measure of the theoretical degree of independence of a central bank, formal
legal independence is of interest because it “suggests the degree of independence that legislators
meant to confer” (Cukierman, 1992), thus serving as an indicator of the seriousness of
                                               
14 On the development of the non-bank segment of the market see Ministerio de Hacienda, Banco Mundial, and Fedesarrollo
(1996).
15 See Stiglitz (1997) for a critical view of central bank independence in a democratic society.
16 On different occasions, the Constitutional Court has clarified these obligations of the Junta. See Hernández (1997).9
institutional reform. Colombia was one of the countries originally included in this index, which
is based on a variety of variables similar to those outlined in this section. The results of this
exercise are summarized in Table 3. The change in the index of formal and legal independence
is dramatic: on a scale of 0 to 1, with 0 representing the lowest degree of independence and 1
the highest, the Monetary Board's index was at 0.27, while that of the current structure doubled
to 0.53. Appendix 1 details the way the coding was carried out and how the variables were
weighted and aggregated into the final index.
In sum, while formal independence has undeniably increased, gaps remain. As already
mentioned, the President maintains significant powers over the naming of Board Directors,
whose length of tenure, while fixed, remains somewhat short by international standards, and
vulnerable to Presidential power. The presence of the Minister of Finance, with full voting
powers, on the Board is another weakness. These drawbacks are a result of the emphasis on
consensus in decision-making, which is also present in the constitutional provision regarding the
imperative of coordinating the Bank’s decisions with those of the Government. In a way, this
emphasis reflects the importance given in Colombia to output stabilization relative to inflation
reduction.
3 THE ORIGINS OF AN INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANK IN COLOMBIA
This section describes, from a political economy point of view, the origins of central
bank independence in Colombia. We argue that the degree of independence of the Colombian
Central Bank has been strongly path dependent, mainly because institutional change has arisen
from within the bank itself, rather than imposed by outside pressures.
Some preliminary discussion on the need for reform of the Junta Monetaria took place
in the early 1980s in light of the consequences of the monetary financing of the fiscal deficit.
The removal of sectoral ministers from the Board, traditionally those who had most pressured
for Bank financing of the government, was proposed.
17 Concern was also expressed regarding
some activities of the Bank itself (as opposed to the Junta Monetaria), in particular the granting
of development credits, which were viewed as highly inflationary, and hindered the
development of a long-term capital market. It is notable that while the containment of inflation
was certainly an issue, its reduction from the 20-30% level was not a major concern.
The ideal opportunity for pushing forward changes in the legal character of the monetary
authority arose with the convening of the Constituent Assembly in 1991. Despite fortunate
timing and the general national sentiment supportive of change, the process of reforming the
Bank was not always smooth. While there was support for the elimination of routine financing
by the Bank of the government and the private sector, the consensus was much weaker
regarding the desirability of complete independence of the Bank from the government in the
formulation of monetary, exchange and credit policies.
18
The initial proposal for reform of the legal status of the Bank came from the
administration of the Bank itself. This proposal was then modified in the Presidency before
being officially submitted to the Assembly. The differences between these two proposals shed
                                               
17 Steiner, 1995, p. 4.
18 Steiner, 1995, p.5.10
light on a number of points of contention, and reflect the various divisions amongst policy
makers regarding their visions of the role of a new, independent, central bank. Interestingly, the
final approved version was closest to the Bank’s original proposal, which placed greater
emphasis on the need to ensure autonomy in a number of areas. Yet due to the lobbying efforts
of the Bank’s administration with the members of the Constituent Assembly, its original
initiative became the de facto basis for discussions, strengthening the proposal significantly.
The main points of contention concerned the proposed pre-eminence of the new Central
Bank in exchange and credit matters. The Bank, in its own document, had envisioned a modern
independent central bank responsible for the country’s monetary exchange rate policies. In
contrast, the Government’s watered-down version seemed to be chiefly concerned with more
limited changes regarding administrative and technical autonomy. With this goal in mind, the
government wanted to isolate the Bank from interest groups and political pressures. The idea
was to remove sectoral ministers from the Board, while transferring some of the functions of the
Junta Monetaria to the Bank. In fact, the reaction of the Ministry of Finance to the Bank’s
proposal was negative, largely due to the fact that the Ministry would be stripped of its pre-
eminence in exchange and credits matters. The Bank’s proposal was explicit in granting the new
institution the ability to establish the regulations regarding monetary, foreign exchange and
credit policies. In contrast, the Government’s proposal referred only to the Bank’s execution of
policies determined by its Board of Directors which was to be, according to the government, the
monetary authority.
In terms of responsibility for the exchange rate, for example, the final agreement was
that the Board would be the exchange authority, but subject to the laws issued by Congress at
the initiative of the government. In other words, the Bank would determine the exchange rate in
accordance with the exchange regime defined by the government through Congress
19. In
practice, this gives the Bank day-to-day management of the nominal exchange rate as well as
market interventions.
A similar hesitation to grant the Bank a completely free reign to pursue the objectives
consecrated in the constitution can be seen in the inclusion by the Constituent Assembly of a
number of its own provisions, which were not explicitly included in either the Bank or
Government proposals. Two of the most relevant address the Bank’s mandate and policy
coordination with the Government. Regarding the mandate of the Bank, the Assembly
established that it was the State, through the Bank, which had the obligation of maintaining the
purchasing power of money. In a positive sense, this requirement in theory obliges the
government to promote a fiscal policy in accordance to the goal of price stability.
The Constitutional reform requires the Bank to coordinate its decisions with the
Government, meaning that the Bank should not completely sacrifice other objectives to price
stability. While coordination of policies is certainly desirable, its inclusion as a requirement in
the constitutional reform merely enhances the impression that the anti-inflationary objective is
                                               
19 There is controversy on the roles of the government and the central bank regarding the exchange rate regime. The
Constitution places the ‘regulation’ of the exchange rate regime in the central bank. The Constitutional Court and the State
Council have issued sentences that state that the role of the government is only ‘indicative’ in this regard. See Hernández
(1997).11
not overriding. The requirement to coordinate in the management of the key variables is
equivalent to saying that these will not be used exclusively for the reduction of inflation, and
introduces a short-run bias to the Bank’s policies. Arguably, this requirement undermined the
credibility of the independent central bank.
The lessons of this experience are various. On the positive side, there was clear support
for the need to modify the existing arrangement, especially regarding the monetary financing of
the government. The objective of controlling inflation enjoyed relatively wide acceptance, at
least in principle. In other words, the objectives preceded the institutional design. Some
consensus on the basics existed, namely on the fact that  sectoral ministers should not be
involved in the Board. Also, the central role played by the Bank itself was crucial, strengthening
the proposals for independence and building a support lobby for its approval. The rest was a
consensus-building process where the involvement of large number of parties was central. This
process had costs and benefits.
In relation to the latter, the consensual origin of the reform resulted in greater public
acceptance of independence. Although there have been threats to independence, there is
growing opposition to counter-reforms in this area. On the other hand, it is precisely this faith in
the importance of consensus building over rules, which weakened the final proposal for an
independent Central Bank. Some examples are the inclusion of the Minister of Finance in the
Board of Directors, as well clause calling for coordination between the Bank and the
Government.
4 INFLATION CONTROL: DOES AUTONOMY MATTER?
As mentioned in the introduction, greater formal independence is neither a sufficient nor
a necessary condition for low inflation. Institutional changes, by themselves, do not buy lower
inflation. For example, in addition to an independent central bank, Germany has a culture that is
averse to inflation. The Indian central bank has no provisions for independence and yet delivers
a low inflation. In fact, in order to lower inflation it is necessary to either appoint conservative-
central-bankers that are allowed to act in an autonomous fashion or, alternatively, to have well-
specified contracts that penalize bankers that do not accomplish what they announce.
This section looks at the Colombian experience before and after the adoption of central
bank independence. As has already been discussed, prior to the 1991 constitutional reforms, the
Central Bank did not possess a clear mandate to concentrate on inflation control as its sole
objective. An evaluation based on its performance in reigning-in inflation during the 1970s and
1980s is instructive as an overview of the decisions that were made and how they were arrived
at by the Monetary Board. It is also useful for comparison with the post-reform era and
illustrative of the types of influences and pressures that weighed on the decision-makers. Such a
review is also indicative of the conditions that induced the Monetary Board to act in a concerted
manner to reduce inflation, and those that did not.
The overall lesson is that at crucial moments in time when the reduction of inflation
should have been its key preoccupation -- as stated time and again in the Advisors' Documents -12
- the Monetary Board was not firm in its anti-inflationary stance.  A gamut of concerns resulted
in the relegation of the fight against inflation to back seat status. These included the stimulation
of economic activity and employment, the reluctance to use the exchange rate as an anti-
inflation tool for fear of jeopardizing the competitiveness of Colombian exports, apart from
general concerns regarding the profitability of the financial sector. We start by looking at the
minutes of the Monetary Board, and then move to some empirical exercises aimed at
understanding the determinants of monetary policy.
4.1 A REVIEW OF THE MINUTES FROM THE MONETARY BOARD
One explanation for Colombia’s 20-30% inflation level over the past 25 years is the
accommodating behavior of the monetary authority in response to inflationary shocks. In this
section we review the Minutes of the Monetary Board and look in depth at the responses of the
monetary authorities to these shocks. We adopt a methodology similar to Echeverry (1995),
who has shown that foreign exchange reserves
20 and food supply shocks are the main
explanation for Colombian inflation, in conjunction with the response of policy-makers to these
shocks.
21
In the event of an unexpected increase in international reserves, an independent and
"strong" monetary policy aimed at reducing inflation would be expected to adopt a
contractionary package. The package would include a real revaluation of the currency and,
when the increase in reserves is not the result of higher capital flows, higher interest rates.
Although in modern times central banks are less inclined to increases in the required reserves
ratio, in the past this instrument was used actively. If autonomy can be partially defined as the
ability to implement difficult or unpopular measures, then a “strong” policy maker would be
equivalent to an autonomous one.
The evidence suggests that “strong” responses by the Central Bank to inflation were
determined by the magnitude of the inflation shock. In other words, the preferences of the
policy makers were such that strong responses were taken only when inflation rates increased
rapidly and dramatically, regardless of the degree of formal autonomy. In fact, in its response to
all but one of the episodes over the two decades under study, the Monetary Board was unable or
unwilling to take the measures necessary for neutralizing the inflationary effects of the shocks
to international reserves. There appears not to be much concern for reducing inflation so much
as for avoiding its further acceleration. On one such occasion, the then President of Colombia
said it clearly: 'it is [only] possible...to  reduce the acceleration of the current inflationary
process, since certain factors of [an] external character are affecting it'
22.
For example, this was the case after the inflow of foreign reserves in 1973, when
inflation jumped from 7% in 1971 to 21% in 1973. Reactions by the Monetary Board to later
shocks were similar. While an increase in food prices can be blamed for generating inflationary
pressures at the end of the 1970s, it is also clear that the Monetary Board did not adhere to
                                               
20 However, treating shocks to international reserves are exogenous may not be correct if policy responses are also crucial for
the balance of payments.
21 He characterizes policy-makers' response to eight episodes of shocks to international reserves between 1971 and 1991, and
traces the behavior of policy tools available to the Monetary Board in the aftermath of those shocks.
22 Quoted by Echeverry (1995).13
inflation-control measures, but merely aimed at containing the increases in the price level.
23
The Advisors to the Board, in a summary of economic conditions for 1979, state that a 24.3%
growth in the Monetary Base can be considered a satisfactory accomplishment given the
expansionary pressures resulting from the accumulation of international reserves, despite a clear
acknowledgment of the danger, in terms of the public's expectations and the implied difficulty
of future reductions in inflation, of validating such levels (near 29% in 1979).
24
In 1986, following an international reserves shock, the decision was made not to
sacrifice the real exchange rate and reserves were consciously accumulated. The Advisors
argued that bank lending to the government and access to profits of the Cuenta Especial de
Cambios
25 were highly expansionary and should be abolished. The Board rejected the Advisors'
arguments, citing the high level of unemployment at the time. The Minister of Finance argued
that denying the Government access to these resources would force it to turn to Congress for
approval of further financing allocations from the Central Bank.
26 The goal in terms of
expansion of M1 was set at 24% for the following year (1987), with the argument that such an
increase would ensure that productive activities could expand without hindrance.
27
Policy-making in 1988, another year with an international reserves shock and high
inflation, was equally lax. In June of that year, inflation reached a level of over 30%. While
there was a concern that monetary policy should not validate this level of inflation, the Board
was distracted by other concerns, including what it considered to be high interest rates, poor
profitability of the financial sector, and lack of liquidity in the economy. In their document of
May 18th, the Advisors go so far as to admit that while monetary policy has been complacent
with respect to average inflation levels,  "...it at least has not been oriented towards the
validation of the highest levels of inflation observed at each moment in time."
28
On one occasion, however, the Monetary Board did unequivocally show a strong anti-
inflation stance: during the events following the large reserves shocks of 1976-1978, which
were mainly the result of high international coffee prices. The impact on inflation was severe: it
skyrocketed from 15% in January 1976 to 34% in mid-1977. The situation was worsened by the
refusal of the government to increase taxes on the coffee sector, thus allowing the full
transmission of the shock to the domestic economy. Also, a widespread drought affected
national agricultural production.
The severity of the increase in inflation between 1976 and 1977, however, appears to
have induced concerted action: on all fronts, the response of the Monetary Board was
unequivocally that of a "strong" policy maker. The ordinary required  reserves ratio was
increased by 3 percentage points and an additional marginal ratio of 100% was implemented,
Government expenditures were reduced and revenues increased through taxation. Anticipated
                                               
23 Echeverry (1995) pp. 33-34.
24 Advisors' Documents, Doc. A-4, January 16, 1980, pp. 36-42.
25 Throughout the years this account (created in 1935) served the purpose of registering the profits derived from the depreciation
of the currency (and the appreciation of gold holdings) and the net return on international reserves. Profits derived from the
multiple exchange system and taxes on coffee exports and overall remittances were also part of the Account. These profits were
transferred as current revenues of the government, representing -at their peak- 23% of total central government’s current
income. See Jaramillo and Montenegro (1984).
26 Acta de la Junta Monetaria, number 12599, October 29, 1986.
27 Advisors' Documents, Doc. A-27, March 1987.
28 Advisors' Documents, Doc. A-066, May 1988, p. 2.14
Imports Deposits were increased, and Exchange Certificates, bonds exchanged for foreign
exchange revenues, were put in place. The combined effect of these measures, in addition to the
effects of a fiscal surplus, was a halving of the Monetary Base. One year later, inflation had
been forced down to 12.6%.
It is interesting to note at this point that in the midst of this particular episode there were
no changes either of the Managing Director of the Central Bank or of the Advisors to the Board.
Neither were there any significant legal changes that allowed the Board to act in a more
autonomous manner. Strong action against inflation was possible due to a consensus among
policy makers at the time that the level of inflation, well above 30%, was inadmissible
29.
However, this need for consensus is a clear indication of the lack of real autonomy. Lower
levels of inflation had not resulted in a similar effort, and would not do so in the future.
To sum, in the absence of consensus any increase in inflation was necessarily validated
by weak or non-committal monetary policy. The emphasis on inflation containment rather than
inflation reduction indicates that the Monetary Board had always possessed the instruments to
fight inflation; what it lacked was the conviction of all parties that the fight was worth the effort.
Tough measures were postponed due to pressures from the sectoral ministers as well as interest
groups. The Advisors repeatedly complained of the inconsistency in the application of monetary
policy by the Board. The Advisors to the Board openly referred, at the time, to the need to
continue resisting political pressures on a number of fronts
30. In fact, the minutes indicate
specific decisions were often taken, "'... in response to pressures from the regions and industry
and trade associations", that are counter to general objectives.
31
How has this situation changed in the years following the creation of an independent
Central Bank?  The removal of sectoral ministers from the Board of Directors was an important
step towards the isolation of monetary policy from political pressures favoring expansion.
Similarly, the prohibition of Central Bank financing of the Government in all but the most
exceptional circumstances has increased the ability of the Board of Directors to withstand
clearly expansionary demands. In this regard, the real autonomy of the Central Bank has
unequivocally increased. But, has the greater autonomy resolved the inflationary bias?
It is tempting to argue that the consequences of this enhanced independence are clearly
visible in the behavior of the Colombian inflation rate. Figure 1 shows the decline in inflation in
the 1990s. It may be arguable that the acceptable upper threshold has fallen from a level of 30%
to one closer to the lower twenties, although such an assertion is difficult to support until such a
threshold is seriously challenged. However, a final evaluation of the actions of the Junta del
Banco de la República requires access to the minutes of the meetings of this institution, which
have not been disclosed yet
32. Also, the ability of monetary and credit policy to achieve inflation
reduction has been severely crippled due to the fact that fiscal adjustment is not forthcoming.
This was the case in Colombia during 1996 and 1997, and as such, the conclusions regarding
the results of monetary policy must be tempered by this fact.
                                               
29 Advisors' Documents, Doc. A-094, August 22, 1990, p.12.
30 Advisors' Documents, Doc. A-99, November 22, 1979, pp. 3-6; Doc. A-102, November 28, 1979, p. 5; and Echeverry (1995),
Summary of the Minutes of the Monetary Board, pp. 27-30.
31 ibid, p.20.
32 These minutes are reserved documents protected by the Constitution (Article 15).15
Figure 1
4.2 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section we present results of various econometric exercises that attempt to
determine whether measures taken by the Bank can be characterized as pro- or counter-cyclical.
Also, we are interested in knowing whether monetary policy has been influenced by the
different institutional arrangements and by other political factors, such as the occurrence of
elections and the type of political party in power. We start by looking at annual data for the
period 1947-1996. The main results are given by the following equation:
* * * * * * * * *
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R
2=0.58; DW=1.86; n=50. *(**)[***] denotes significance at 10%(5%)[1%] level.
t m &  is the percentage change in M1,  t y &  is GDP’s growth rate, DJM is a dummy variable that
takes a value of 1 during the Junta Monetaria years (1963-1991), DJD is a dummy variable that
takes a value of 1 during the independent Junta Directiva  years (1992-1996), t is a time trend,
and DLIB is a dummy variable that takes a unitary variable during liberal governments.
This regression is of interest because it indicates that, on average, monetary policy has
been counter-cyclical in Colombia. A one-percentage point increase in economic growth at time
t-1 is followed at time  t  with a decrease in monetary growth by 1.03 percentage points.
Furthermore, this result has been invariant to the institutional arrangement. However, during the
period of independence of the central bank, annual money growth has been, on average, 6.7%
lower than before. It is interesting to note that money growth has accelerated throughout the
period at a rate of 0.2 percentage points per year. Moreover, this rate of acceleration has been
0.3 percentage points per year during Liberal governments, indicating that partisan cycles have
influenced monetary policy
33.
                                               
33 This is not true for political business cycles that suggest greater expansion at election years.
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We performed a similar exercise using GDP deviations from trend as a measure of the
business cycle:
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R
2=0.57; DW=2.00; n=50,
where  y denotes the (log) deviations from a Hodrick-Prescott GDP trend. Again, the results
suggest the counter-cyclical character of monetary policy and the secular acceleration in money
growth (especially during liberal administrations). Also, monetary expansion has been lower
after independence. These results are consistent with Escobar (1996) who found greater
monetary expansion during liberal governments. In sum, the legal changes introduced in the
Constitution of 1991 had a permanent effect of monetary policy. In a way, they lowered the
average annual growth in money, but did not eliminate the acceleracionist bias, which is more
palpable during liberal administrations.
To further analyze these issues we identified five periods of interest over the past two
decades. During these periods the rate of growth of GDP was particularly high -- above 6% for
at least two consecutive quarters -- or low, below 2%, again for at least two consecutive
quarters. As can be seen in Figure 2, three of these incidents took place prior to the granting of
independence to the Central Bank, and two following independence. Two of the five periods
were booms (1978.II-1979.I and 1993.III-1995.III), while three were recessions (1981.IV-
1983.II, 1990.III-1991.III, and the current downturn in the economy which began in 1996).
       Figure 2
The exercise traced the behavior of five variables, namely the real exchange rate, the
interest rate, the required reserves ratio, as well as M1 and inflation, over an 18-month period
following the realizations of exceptionally high or low growth rates. The methodology follows
Romer and Romer (1989) and estimates univariate forecasting equations for each variable, and
then examines the difference between their forecasted and actual behavior during the five
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periods.
34 The forecast indicates the behavior of the variable that would have occurred without
any intervention. Should, for instance, actual interest rates be higher than the forecast, one may
conclude that the Central Bank had followed a  contractionary policy with respect to that
variable.
We use quarterly data from 1969:1 until 1996:2 (with the exception of the series for
required reserves, which extends until 1996:4). Definitions of each of the variables, as well as
results of Dickey-Fuller unit root tests can be found in Table 4. The forecast is made using an
autoregressive model that takes into account 24 lags. By using two years of information we try
to control for the possibility that the economy may naturally experience a downturn (expansion)
following periods of high (low) growth, regardless of the policies pursued by the Central Bank.
Thus, the lag structure reduces the bias in the forecasts.
The results indicate that the forecast equations are adequate in capturing the behavior of
the five series.
35 Dynamic forecasts are then carried out for the 18-months following the
initiation of each of the five periods mentioned above. The differences between these forecasts
and the actual behavior of each of the variables are shown in figures 3-7.  The dates indicate the
quarter of initiation of the recession or boom.
Figure 3
                                               
34 Echeverry (1995) also uses this method in his work on foreign exchange reserve shocks and inflation in Colombia.
35 Q-statistics show that no problems of serial correlation persist with 24 lags.
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Figure 7
Again, our interest lies in characterizing the behavior of the Central Bank as pro- or
counter-cyclical. In boom times, a “strong” policy maker would be expected to raise nominal
interest rates and to lower the growth of M1. Thus, the package would lead to a real revaluation
of the currency and a decline in the growth of inflation. Similarly, a conservative Central Bank
will give more weight to inflation reduction than to the recovery of the economy (compared to
the government’s preferences). In other words, although there is some room for monetary
expansion, the central banker would not jeopardize inflationary targets during recessions.
During the two periods where growth rates accelerated, namely in the 1978-79 period
and the 1993-95 years, the behavior of the Bank’s policy instruments was similar. Real
exchange rates behaved as expected (revalued) but actual M1 was higher than forecasted for
both periods. Interest rates in 1978 were initially below forecast values, but increased later (8
periods into the shock). In 1993, interest rates increased only one year following the initiation of
the expansion and required reserves were held below their forecast value throughout the
expansion. Interest rates did not increase immediately because of the fear that they would
exacerbate capital inflows.
In this sense, the implementation of a contractionary package relied more heavily on the
appreciation of the currency, which in turn did not curb the consumption boom. However, the
results in terms of inflation were favorable both in 1978 and in 1993, although for the first
period inflation began to rise again 12 months following the coffee shock. Later, in mid-1994 a
fully counter-cyclical contractionary package was implemented, including an increase in interest
rates
36. Nonetheless, as similar actions were taken in 1978/79, one cannot make the claim that
this was necessarily due to a tougher, more independent, institution.
We also analyzed three periods where (annualized) quarterly growth rates fell to below
2% for at least two consecutive quarters. Two of these incidents, those that occurred in 1981
                                               
36 The 1993 expansion was, to a large extent, induced by fiscal and monetary policy, and not the result of terms of trade shocks,
as in the late 1970s. However, exogenous capital inflows were also a major force leading to the expansion in 1993.
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and in 1990, took place prior to the granting of independence, and one followed the
Constitutional reforms of 1991. The results are mixed. On the exchange rate, interest rate and
M1 fronts, there are no clear signs of expansionist behavior prior to independence. As for the
required reserves ratio, the behavior of the Banco de la República may be seen as counter-
cyclical (in terms of GDP) during 1990. In fact, the actual ratio was approximately 5 points
below what would be expected according to the forecast. Not surprisingly, in terms of inflation
results, 1981 was slightly below forecast, whereas 1990 was above.
Since 1996 the economy has been experiencing a slowdown. This is the first episode
since the granting of independence to the Banco de la República. On the positive side, growth in
M1 has been consistently below forecasts, in line with the results obtained with the annual data.
Also, the difference between the actual real exchange rate and its forecast is negative, indicating
a revaluation. It must be noted, however, that in all five episodes analyzed, both booms and
recessions, the exchange rate has been revalued.
The behavior of the remaining three variables is of interest. Actual interest rates fell
below their forecasted values two periods after the shock and have continued their decline since.
Throughout 1996, the Government worked towards garnering the support of the private sector
and Congress to influence a more expansive monetary policy. The presence of the Minister of
Finance on the Board of Directors, ostensibly for coordination purposes between the Bank and
the Government, in fact translated into a voice expressing the Government's concerns regarding
the decline in productive activity, and the impact of restrictions on liquidity and of high interest
rates. Clearly, the arguments used go beyond the Board's mandate of inflation reduction, and
undermine the isolation of the Board from political pressures.
37 Although there was some room
for a reduction in interest rates, the end result was inconsistent with the inflation goal set for
1996 (see Figure 8). The magnitude of the reduction in interest rates is suggestive of the
presence of short-term expansionist pressures, rather than responding to long-term objectives
befitting an independent central bank. This is even more worrisome in the context of a growing
fiscal deficit that created additional difficulties for economic adjustment. In fact, the difficulties
experienced by the financial sector during 1996 posed what was perhaps the greatest restriction
on the imposition of a tight monetary policy.
38
Also, throughout 1996 and 1997 the required reserve ratio was steadily reduced. As can
be seen in figure 5, this ratio plunged four months following the shock to levels significantly
below those forecasted. However, this reduction cannot entirely be attributed to pressures for
monetary expansion, as there were technical arguments to bring these requirements in line with
international standards. At any rate, inflation rates following the 1996 shock were significantly
above their forecast based on the autoregressive model.
                                               
37 In the middle of 1996 the Minister of Finance made public statements regarding the failure in the achievement of the Board's
intermediate targets for the year, in particular in terms of credit growth and monetary aggregates which were considered to be
too low.
38 Overdue accounts receivable were at particularly high levels for the system as a whole, and in particular for the commercial
finance companies, where overdue accounts represented over 13% of the total, the highest level for the decade.21
Figure 8
In sum, the results of this section indicate that monetary policy has played a counter-
cyclical role in Colombia, regardless of the institutional design. However, during the period of
an independent Junta monetary expansion has been, on average, lower than before. Possibly,
this result is a direct consequence of the elimination of lending operations to the public and
private sectors. Despite the clarity of mandate to preserve the value of money, monetary policy
in practice still is influenced by a multiplicity of objectives, particularly during recessions or
periods of low growth. As was the case prior to independence, these concerns include
productive activity, employment generation and the health of the financial sector.
5  CONCLUSIONS
This study has shown that the government-controlled Junta Monetaria adopted truly
anti-inflationary policies only when inflation rates increased rapidly and dramatically. Strong
action against inflation was possible only after a consensus among policymakers was reached
(the consensus being that a rate of inflation above 30% was inadmissible). This need for
consensus is a clear indication of the lack of real autonomy on the part of the central bank. The
end result, as is clearly observable in the Colombian case, was a shift from the emphasis on
inflation reduction to inflation containment, combined with an active use of monetary policy for
output stabilization. In other words, the Junta Monetaria always possessed the instruments to
fight inflation; what it lacked was the conviction of all parties that the fight was worth the effort.
In relation to the legally independent Junta Directiva, the paper concludes that money
growth has been lower after 1992, mainly due to the Constitutional restrictions on central bank
lending to the private and public sectors. However, inflation control has not been the only
objective of monetary policy. In this sense, the central bank has not been isolated from the
consensual nature of economic policy making in Colombia.
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Thus, the institutional reform has not implied a dramatic reduction in inflation. The
government-controlled Junta Monetaria often ignored the advice of the Asesores de la Junta, a
conservative group of technocrats that had no voting powers. The preferences of the
independent members of  Junta  Directiva reveal less tolerance for inflation than under the
previous regime, but continue to place weight on output and employment stabilization in their
objective function. The end result has been a gradual and slow decline in inflation.23
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Part II. Does Independence improve Performance?
 The Colombian Superintendency of Banks
39
1. Introduction
It is increasingly accepted that the main purpose of banking regulation and supervision
should be the encouragement of efficient banking, while at the same time ensuring the protection
of depositors and safeguarding the financial system and the payment mechanism. Many countries
have seen a recent shift in their regulatory frameworks, from a stress on repressive measures
comprising strict controls over the financial system to a systems based on preventive or
prudential regulation. Prudential regulation is oriented to the detection of poor performance, and
to the promotion of risk diversification. All the while stressing the need to allow market forces to
function with relative freedom in order to promote competition and to enhance efficiency in the
industry.
In addition to regulation, supervision and control are also required to monitor the
performance of financial institutions. This is where the issue of autonomy becomes relevant.
Independence of the supervisory agency from pressure groups is essential in order to insulate it
from the interests of regulated institutions. This is particularly the case if the supervisory
framework relies on a large measure of discretion rather than rules to determine the timing of
interventions in problematic banks. In the words of David Folkerts-Landau (1996) “the political
challenge is to establish a credible independent supervisor with regulatory powers, cease and
desist powers, on-site inspection ability, licensing powers and the ability to remove managers
who are not fit and proper.”
40 In other words, supervisors should have the tools to implement
corrective measures and the political independence necessary to act.
Other generally agreed upon requirements is that the supervisory agency be universal and
preventive. Universality implies that supervision encompass all financial institutions within the
market. A preventive system is preferred to one based on punishment, implying that supervisors
should not focus merely on compliance, but also be able to judge the quality of managerial assets
as well as the capacity of banks to deal with risk.
There is less agreement on two other issues. First, whether the institution should be
specialized in the supervision of financial intermediaries remains as an open question. Second,
there is no consensual view on who should be responsible for the regulatory and supervisory
framework: whether the regulatory responsibility should lie within the legislative or the
executive branches of government, and if a public or mixed agency should carry out supervisory
functions. The degree of independence from the executive is controversial.
This paper addresses these issues by looking at the Colombian experience where
regulation is developed within the executive branch of government, as in Chile, Peru and
                                               
39 This paper is part of a regional research project sponsored by the InterAmerican Development Bank. We would like to thank
Claudia Piras and Gerardo Hernández for comments and suggestions.
40 David-Folkerts Landau (1996), Commentary to Aristobolo de Juan’s paper on “The Roots of Banking Crises: Microeconomic
Issues”.26
Venezuela. In terms of the development of rules and regulations for the financial sector, Ecuador
is the only Latin American country where specific regulations for the financial sector are
developed within the legislative branch. Central banks determine the rules on financial regulation
and supervision in Argentina, Bolivia and Paraguay. Brazil and Mexico are exceptions to the
rule: financial sector regulation is relegated to a collective body or college known as the banking
commission in which both the executive and the central bank participate. (See Table 1).
Table 1
Regulation Institution Country
General Regulation Parliament All Countries
Specific Regulation
Financial Central Bank All Countries
Institutional Parliament All Countries
Prudential Parliament Ecuador
Government Colombia
Superintendency of Banks Chile, Peru
Parliament and SB Venezuela
Central Bank Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay
Parliament and Central Bank Uruguay
Collegial Institution Brazil, Mexico
An effective regulatory structure is accompanied by an institution that performs
supervision and control of the financial sector. Agencies dedicated to supervision may be
divided in two categories: publicly run or mixed agencies (see Table 2). In Latin America, mixed
agencies are less common than publicly run agencies; in fact, Panama is the only country where
supervision is performed by a mixed committee of seven members, three of whom are
representatives of the private sector. This has generally led to conflicts of interest that have
resulted in an ineffective supervisory system.
Table 2
Type of Superivsory Agency Country
   Mixed Panama
   Public
Collegial Mexico
Shared United States
Individual Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and
Venezuela
   Central Bank Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay
Supervision by the public sector can be of three types: colleges, shared supervision
among a number of agencies (the US is an example of this) and individual institutions. The
prevalent structure in Latin America is the latter: an individual government agency, which
supervises financial institutions. Countries are, however, divided among those where supervision
is performed by the central bank and those with an institution dedicated solely to that task. In the
former group are Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay which have their supervisory agency within the27
central bank, while in Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and
Venezuela there is a free-standing governmental agency dedicated to supervision and control. In
Mexico a college whose membership is made up of Central Bank and Cabinet representatives
practices control
41. Within this type of structure it is usually the central banks duty to carry out
the in situ inspection of each financial institution.
In some Latin American countries, an additional institution exists within the regulatory
and supervisory structure. These are support authorities that offer deposit insurance to the public.
In Latin America, Colombia, Chile, El Salvador and Venezuela have support authorities within
their systems.
2. Banking Regulation and Supervision in Colombia
The Colombian Superintendency of Banks (SB) was created in 1923
42 as a branch of the
central government and was given the faculty to implement all laws related to commercial banks,
mortgage banks, the Central Bank and most, though not all, financial intermediaries. Since its
creation, the SB has not been a formally independent entity, but rather one that reports directly to
the Ministry of Finance. In this paper we will try to assess the degree of ex-post real autonomy
of this institution. In particular, our emphasis will be on the interaction between autonomy, the
sectorial context within which the SB operates, and the various potential pressure groups with
interests in the SB's decisions.
Since its creation, the Superintendency has undergone various changes. The obligation of
implementing annual visits to the financial intermediaries was introduced in 1941 (Law 57), as
well as the criteria for intervention. The inspection of official public institutions was introduced
in 1950 (Decree 975)
43.
Colombia’s support authority (Fondo de  Garantías de  Institutciones  Financieras,
FOGAFIN) was created by Law 117 of 1985. This institution is responsible of carrying out all
the decisions enacted by the SB concerning the intervention of institutions. Additionally,
FOGAFIN manages the assets within the sector that are property of the state, and the system of
deposit insurance.
Given the tight relationship between the development of the SB and the evolution of the
financial sector, it is necessary to summarize some of the main events that have taken place over
the years and the changing character of both the sector and the SB.  As in many other Latin
American countries, Colombia's experience with financial intervention can be divided into two
periods, before and after the financial crisis of 1982 when adverse macroeconomic conditions
affected the operation and asset quality in the sector. However, the limited effectiveness of the
                                               
41 France, Belgium and Italy are examples of non Latin American countries that have this type of structure within their markets.
42 In 1922 Congress authorized the government to hire five foreign advisors on financial and taxation matters in what later
became the Kemmerer Mission. Following its recommendations, Law 45 of 1923 created the Superintendency of Banks.
43 The  Superintendency has been restructured several times by the following Decrees: a. No. 294 (1959) established four
divisions (banks, insurance and capitalization funds, administration, and technical studies). B. No. 125 (1976) created thirteen
divisions. c. No. 1939 (1986) established two delegated superintendents. d. No. 1033 (1991) added another delegated
superintendency. e. No. 2359 (1993) established 5 delegated superintendencies.28
regulatory and supervisory framework led to a loosening of banking standards, which
exacerbated the crisis.
Figures 1 and 2 show the levels of capitalization in the years around the crisis. Clearly,
the lack of adequate regulation made the financial sector more vulnerable to macroeconomic
shocks. As a consequence, portfolio quality declined rapidly (Figures 3 and 4) and banks found
themselves unable to attend to the public's demand for withdrawals. The crisis forced the
nationalization of the Banco de Colombia and the intervention of the  Banco de Bogotá, the
country's two largest banks, as well as that of a number of other institutions.
Figure 1
Figure 2
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Figure 3
Figure 4
Authorities became aware that the existing structure of intervention was not efficient in
the timely detection of problems in the sector or in their prevention. The instruments used for
supervising and regulating the financial sector were obsolete and ineffective, and a general
consensus was formed to the effect that intervention should in the future be preventive and
prudential, rather than relying on reserve requirements and compulsory investments as decreed
by the Monetary Board
44. Since then, a number of changes have been enacted to leave behind a
system whose emphasis was on using the financial system as a vehicle to promote wider
economic objectives at the cost of its health and stability.
45
The financial reform law, enacted in 1990 (Ley 45), was aimed at the creation of a
financial system which would operate under conditions of greater freedom, solidity and
efficiency, thus supporting the goals of internationalization and modernization of the economy as
                                               
44  The Monetary Board, until 1991, was the body responsible for monetary management in the country.
45 A summary of these changes is available from the authors.
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a whole. Measures were taken to encourage the recuperation and consolidation of the sector by
adjusting towards international standards in prudential regulation. The promotion of
transparency, an increased participation of foreign investment in the financial sector, the
dismantling of a variety of quasi-fiscal burdens which had hampered the operation of agents in
the system, were also included in the law. In addition, the proportion of public interests in the
financial sector began to decline from their levels in the early nineties.
Nevertheless, while the goals of regulation and supervision have undergone great
changes, from repressive measures to preventive controls, the institutional structure of the SB
has remained relatively unaltered, and continues to be characterized by a low level of formal
independence.
3. Institutional Design
Table 3 summarizes the main institutional features of the SB. As mentioned above, the
SB was created through the introduction of a law. This confers relative stability to the
institution's structure and objectives, as Congress must approve any adjustment, although laws
are easier to abrogate than are constitutional amendments. The Superintendent is appointed by
the President of Colombia, but can be dismissed at will. There are no requirements in terms of
experience or professional background. The actual average tenure is much shorter, however, as
will be seen below. The President also appoints and dismisses the delegated superintendents who
are the officials with the next highest status within the SB's hierarchy. The power of the
President to appoint and remove the Superintendent at will has been reflected in the number of
superintendents over the years. Since 1974, there have been 12 Superintendents, while 7
Presidents were elected over the same period (Table 4). This translates into an average tenure of
less than two years, half of the Presidential term.
Traditionally, the Superintendent has not been a politician, but almost always a
professional economist or a lawyer with expertise in the financial sector. In recent years,
superintendents have come from the central bank or the ministry of finance. Moreover, in many
instances superintendents have been promoted to  higher ranking positions within the
government. Importantly, the Superintendent has not been removed during the last two
presidential changes. The delegated superintendents have frequently been career professionals
from with the superintendency.
Although the SB was changed with the monitoring of the financial sector it was not
granted initially the ability to create rules and regulations on its own. Until the financial crisis of
1982 all rules were created jointly by the Monetary Board and the SB. The legal changes that
took place in terms of regulation of the financial sector, Law 35 of 1993 modified the
institutional structure of intervention. A new body, the Technical  Viceministry, was created
within the Ministry of Finance and was made responsible for the drafting of rules and regulation
in the sector. Some regulatory faculties that had been under the charge of the SB were transferred
to the Technical Viceminister of Finance. Regulations concerning accounting within banks, the
creation of new banks, and mergers or acquisitions of existing ones are still in the hands of the
Superintendent.31
As in other public agencies, the Superintendency issues administrative acts that can be
appealed to the Superintendency or demanded to the judiciary system. The Superintendent does
not have a special legal immunity and can be denounced. In fact, during the 1980s one of the
Superintendents was removed form his post by the Attorney General, on the grounds of errors in
the supervision.
The Minister of Finance is ultimately responsible for all spending decisions within the SB
(see Table 3 for the details). Its budget has relied solely on obligatory contributions made by the
institutions within the sector. The amount to be contributed is determined by the Superintendent
but must be approved by the Minister of Finance.
46  These contributions are placed in a fund that
is part of the general budget to be later transferred to the SB. The central government may keep
some of the resources.
The Ministry of Finance must approve all of the SB’s expenses. The Superintendent has
no independence of decision-making regarding long-term investment projects. The lack of
budgetary autonomy in the SB has often been criticized because of the negative consequences for
the agency's ability to strengthen its technical capacity to fulfill its responsibilities.
The Superintendent must present an annual report of activities to the Minister of
Finance
47 and a detailed monthly report of its expenditures to the  Contralor General de la
República. The annual report has been presented promptly and published annually. It has been
incorporated into the report that the Ministry of Finance is obliged to present before Congress
every year. The  Superintendency is also required to publish the financial statements of the
intermediaries under its control and supervision.
Hence, after a long process of reforms, the financial sector's regulatory and supervisory
structure currently consists of a Superintendency of Banks within the executive branch whose
objectives are to supervise and control the intermediaries, a support authority known as
FOGAFIN, the Technical Vice Ministry in charge of enacting all the regulation with the sector,
supported by a set of prudential rules and regulations. Throughout the years the institutional
structure of the SB has undergone few changes, in particular with respect to its degree of formal
independence which has remained low. The questions we seek to answer in what follows relate
to how the low level of independence has translated into the degree of real autonomy and how
the performance of the Superintendency has been affected by it. The question remains, however,
as to whether the SB's lack of formal autonomy has been reflected in the agency's fulfillment of
its monitoring and control responsibilities towards the financial sector. In order to do so, we now
turn to a discussion of the sectorial context within which the SB operates.
                                               
46  Art. 329 literal c (see Table 3).
47 Art. 329 literal d.32
Table 3  Design of the Superintendency of Banks
Design
Variables
Legal Structure Created by  Law
45 of 1923
The amendments of laws must be done through Congress. The constitution is the most difficult
structure to amend, and within the hierarchy, laws follow.
Congress is responsible for the creation or abolition of the different superintendencies. This does
not rule out the possibility for Congress to entitle the executive to restructure the organization of






The Superintendency of Banks is a technical organization subscribed to the Ministry of Finance
and is responsible for the accomplishment of the following objectives:
a)  Ensure the public’s confidence in the financial system and certify that the institutions
maintain solid economic performance and appropriate liquidity coefficients.
b)  Supervise integrally, the activity of the institutions under their control, to ensure the
compliance with financial regulation and to assure adherence with foreign currency
obligations.
c)  Guarantee that the institutions under their control deliver adequately their services to the
public under strict conditions of transparency, security and efficiency.
d)  Prevent that unauthorized people carry out activities that are restricted to the supervised
institutions.
e)  Prevent adverse circumstances that can lead to the loss of trust of the public in the financial
institutions.
f)  Supervise that the institutions of the sector comply with the mechanisms of prudential
regulation.
g)  Guarantee that the supervised institutions adhere to the norms established by the Central
Bank.
h)  Ensure that the supervised institutions carry out activities that do not restrict free market
competition, and that are within the limits of good faith.




Law 45 of 1923
Art. 19
Art. 329 literal (a)
48
The Superintendent of Banks will be appointed and removed freely by the President of Colombia.
The Superintendent of Banks can:
(a) Name, remove and distribute the staff of the institution in accordance with legal dispositions,




Law 45 of 1923
Art. 19
Art. 329
(See appointment of authorities)
(See appointment of authorities)
Term Law 45 de 1923
Art. 19
The Superintendent of Banks (…) will be appointed for a period of 4 years.
Re- election of
Authorities
There are no restrictions for the re-election of authorities within the Superintendency
Personnel The SB follows the same personnel regime as the rest of the public sector.
                                               




Law 45 de 1923
Art. 19
Art. 337
The Superintendent of Banks (…) cannot be employee, manager, or stockholder of any
institution that is protected by this law, or be a proprietor directly or indirectly of any of these
institutions.
The Superintendent of Banks must be a Colombian citizen.
Personnel
Management
Art. 337 (8)   Personnel Management. All the pertinent matters related to the management of
personnel in aspects such as the selection process, distribution of responsibilities,
placement of personnel and in general any internal matters concerning the global
management of the institution,  will be done by the superintendent who can entrust this
functions when necessary.
Financial Means Art. 329 literal c) It is the duty of the superintendent to …
c) Determine the amount of the contributions to be done by the supervised institutions, with
previous approval of the Minister of Finance. These contributions will constitute the means of
financing of the agency.
Budgetary
Process
Art. 337 Management of the Contributions. The General Direction of Treasury, and the Ministry of
Finance will manage the contributions done by financial intermediaries for the maintenance
of the Superintendency of Banks.
 
1.  Entrusting expenditures. The Minister of Finance can delegate the approval of
expenditures to the General Secretary or the Manager of Finances of the
Superintendency of Banks.
Supervision Art. 329 literal d)
Art. 24 Law 45 of
1923
It is the duty of the superintendent to …
d) Present an annual report of the activities of the Superintendency to the Minister of Finance.
At the end of each month, the superintendent of banks will present to the Contralor General
de la República a detailed report of the verified operations executed with the funds of the
Superintendency.
Publications The annual report presented by the Superintendent to the Minister of Finance has been
published regularly.34
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4. Context: Structure of the Financial Sector
Although the SB supervises over ninety institutions, the degree of concentration within
the financial sector is relatively high, and points to the possibility of the existence of a number of
powerful interest groups which might seek to pressure the SB. In 1995, for example, six
economic consortia owned 71.2% of total assets of the sector (see Table 5).  Nevertheless, the
fact that the law grants the SB ample powers of supervision and intervention
49, and given the
visibility of the SB's decisions as well as the presence of a number of independent agencies that
evaluate risk, it is difficult to reach any clear conclusion regarding the true ability of the SB to
withstand pressures of existing interest groups. In order to assess the real autonomy of the SB it
is necessary to evaluate the SB's performance over time and with respect to the specific groups.
                                               
49 Art 114, 326 (table 4).- 36 -





Concentration of the Sector At the end of 1995, the biggest economical groups within the sector where:
Sindicato Antioqueño, 16 institutions, owning 20.5% of total assets of the
financial market.
Grupo Sarmiento Angulo 14.1% of total assets, owning 15 institutions
Grupo Cafetero 11.3% of total assets and 11 institutions.
Grupo Ganadero 9.2% of total assets and 5 institutions
Grupo Santodomingo 7.4% of total assets and 13 institutions
Grupo Gilinsky 8.7% of total assets and 5 institutions
6 groups had 71.2% of total assets in 1995
50
Privately vs. Publicly ran
Institutions
In 1995 78% of total assets where privately owned, and the other 22% were
owned by publicly ran or mixed institutions. (1)
Legal Instruments For:
Supervision
Art. 326 literal (4)
Prevention and
Sanctions
Art. 326 literal 5
(4) The Superintendency of Banks can:
(a) Practice visits of inspection when there is evidence of irregular practices
within the institutions.
(b) Obtain information from people that are not part of the financial sector
if considered relevant for the duties of supervision.
(c) Question, under oath, any person whose testimony can be helpful in
clarifying the truth about any legal procedure done by the Superintendency.
(5) The Superintendency of Banks can:
(a) Formulate the necessary instructions in order to suspend non-authorized
practices.
(b) Impose one or many of the preventive measures granted in article 108
literal 1 of this law, to the people that execute financial activities that are
exclusive of institutions that are supervised and controlled by the agency.
(c) Adopt any of the following actions, to prevent the seizure of any of the
supervised institutions
  - Establish a special supervisory regime.
  -Coordinate with the Fondo de Garantias the necessary actions in
accordance with the law
  -Ordain the capitalization of the institution in accordance with legal
requirements
  -Promote the partial or total cession of the assets, liabilities or contracts or
the expropriation of its commercial establishments to another
institution.
  -Promote for the fusion of the institution
(d) Take immediate possession of the goods and businesses of a supervised
institution when one of the events mentioned in the article 114 of this law
occurs, granted that a previous concept and approval of the minister of
finance is given.
(e) Transfer to FOGAFIN or to the competent judge the businesses and
                                               
50 Jaramillo, C. F. (1996)37
Seizure
Art. 114
goods of the intervened institution for their liquidation
(f) To order that the legal representatives of the institutions under special
supervision refrain from carrying out agreements between themselves or
promote financial association or any practice that has as objective to
impede free competition within the financial sector.
Reasons that justify Seizure:
When an institution fails to pay their legal contribution to the SB
When an institution refuses to submit their archives, accounting books, and
other documents for inspection by the SB
When the legal representative or manager of an institution refuses to be
interrogated with relationship with his activities within the sector.
When the institution breaks the law contemplated in the Estatuto Organico
del Sector Financiero.
When an unlawful handling of the institution persists after being notified.
When the net assets is lower than 50% of the subscribed capital.
Visibility of the SB’s
decisions
All of the decisions made by the SB are completely visible. They are
communicated to the institutions involved through a legal instrument
known as circulares externas, and these ciruclares are published regularly
in a magazine called Legislacion Economica.
Number of agencies that
evaluate risks
In Colombia, there are 2 agencies that evaluate risk of financial institutions.
The main sectors with an interest in pressuring decisions by the SB are private economic
consortia, a variety of financial sector associations and of course, the government. Table 6 shows
the evolution of the associations of financial institutions in Colombia since the 1960s. In the
1980's there were four organizations of financial intermediaries: the Banking Association of
Colombia (ASOBANCARIA)
51, the National Association of Financial Institutions (ANIF), the
National Association of Insurance Companies (FASECOLDA) and the Colombian Institution of
Housing and Savings (ICAV)
52. There is general agreement that these organizations have not
been concerned with the formation of lobbies for specific group interests
53. Urrutia (1983), for
example, concludes that the ASOBANCARIA (the largest financial association in Colombia,
whose members represent 80% of total assets of the financial sector
54) has served mainly as an
association to provide services to its members. Similarly, ANIF
55 did not function as a traditional
association in the sector because it basically served as an instrument of opinion for its presidents.
Therefore, one may conclude that the main objective of the associations within the financial
sector has not been restricted to influencing the supervision that affects their members. The same
                                               
51 The National Association of Banks was created in 1936 and is one of the oldest and most traditional associations in the
country. In 1981 it comprised 22 banks, 19 Corporaciones Financieras, 7 almacenes generales de depósitos and 3 corporaciones
de ahorro y vivienda as members of the association. The Association employed about 165 people.
52 ANIF was created at the end of the 1970s by the head of the Grupo Grancolombiano, Jaime Michelsen. Urrutia (1983) believes
that the motive behind the creation of the new association within the sector was that many newly established non-traditional
financial intermediaries were not well received within ASOBANCARIA because their objectives were to evade governmental
restrictions. Therefore these new institutions joined with some traditional ones to create the new association.
53 ASOBANCARIA and ANIF are the associations of the sector which are most recognized. In an interview with high officials of
the Central Bank, those were the only two associations recognized as existing. The other four institutions that exist today as
associations of the sector were not even mentioned.
54 Interview with employees of the ASOBANCARIA.
55 ANIF is a relatively small association with 31 highly heterogeneous members, representing all types of institutions within the
sector.38
conclusions can be made regarding the more recently formed associations. In sum, the
Superintendency has been a technical entity with large autonomy. There are natural pressures on
the Superintendent, but the financial associations have been more committed to a sound
supervision, rather than to the defense of particular interests on behalf of their affiliates.
Table 6   Evolution of Colombia´s Financial Sector Associations
Colombia's Financial Sector Associations
1961 1970 1980 1997
Asociacion Bancaria de Colombia (ASOBANCARIA) x x x x
Asociacion Nacional de Instituciones Financieras (ANIF) x x
Asociacion Colombiana de Aseguradores (Fasecolda) x x x x
Instituto Colombiano de Ahorro y Vivienda (ICAV) x x
Asociacion Nacional de Fondos de Pensiones (ASOFONDOS) x
Fedeleasing x
Comercial Financing Companies x
Asociacion de Fiduciarias x
5. The Superintendency in Practice - Private Sector
Evidence on the performance of the SB during the financial crisis of the 1980s indicates
that with respect to private economic groups the Superintendency has acted independently. As
was the case in a number of Latin American countries, several Colombian banks were intervened
during the financial crisis of the 1980s.
A good example is that of the  Grupo  Grancolombiano, one of the largest groupings
within the financial sector, with 13 institutions representing close to 10% of the sector's total
assets at the time. The SB intervened in the three largest companies owned by the group: the
Banco de Colombia, the Corporación Financiera Grancolombiana, and a commercial finance
company the  Grancolombiana de  Promociones "Pronta". The three companies represented a
majority, 77.1%, of the group's total assets within the financial sector. The indexes of quality of
the loan portfolio and of capitalization clearly reveal the necessity of the interventions. The
Banco de Colombia's index of portfolio quality shows a distinct deterioration, from 4.17% of
loans in arrears in 1983, to a maximum of 43.84% in 1985 (Figure 5). Simultaneously, its index
of capitalization reached its lowest point, 0.27% in the same year, revealing the institution's poor
response capacity to demands for withdrawals from the public (Figure 6). In the case of Pronta,
the quality of its loan portfolio had also deteriorated dramatically, from 6.8% in 1984 to 38.4%
in 1985 (Figure 7).
Interviews conducted with members of the financial sector support the assertion that the
SB has acted in a largely independent manner with respect to the financial sector.
56 Table 7
presents a summary of interview results. Without exception all responses expressed the belief
                                               
56 Interviews with a number of participants within the sector were an important source of information for this section.39
that the SB is indeed independent in its decisions from the pressures of private interest groups,
and particularly from economic groups.
Figure 5
Figure 6
It is important to mention that although the available evidence points towards the
independence of the SB from pressures of private interest groups this is a surprising conclusion
given the concentration of property within the sector.
57 One issue that does emerge from the
review of events, however, is the delay by the SB in taking action. As mentioned above, the
Superintendency -- in both the case of the Banco de Colombia and in that of Pronta -- waited
until loans in arrears reached nearly 44% in the former and 38% in the latter. While the SB may
not be subject to strong pressures on the part of private banks, the incentives for the
                                               
57 It is even more surprising if we consider the evidence from a recent study by Steiner et al. (1997), in which the authors find
that the financial sector presents evidence of monopolistic behavior. Institutions within the sector fix the interest rate about 20%
above the marginal cost.
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Superintendent to take decisive and timely action seem to be absent.  An explanation may lie in
the combination of a high level of discretion -- the absence of clear rules or thresholds for
intervention -- and the requirement that the Minister of Finance approve all decisions.
Figure 7
The SB enjoys a high degree of discretion in the type of intervention it chooses to
undertake. Article 114 of the Estatuto Orgánico del Sistema Financiero lists the grounds for
intervening an institution, which basically grants the Superintendent the ability to decide based
upon his own judgment. In the 1980s the means of intervention varied depending on the level of
deterioration in performance in each institution. Different methods were used: one bank was
liquidated, while some banks were nationalized, with the government taking over the banks'
activities and assets. In other cases, the management of the financial intermediary was
transferred to the SB, and after the institution-regained stability, the shareholders again took
control of operations. The first case of intervention was that of the Banco Nacional, liquidated in
1982. Indicators such as portfolio quality and an index of capitalization both show a clear
deterioration in the performance of the institution (Figure 8 and 9). The Superintendent also
justified the decision to liquidate on the basis of the high concentration of the institution's
portfolio in companies that were part of the very group that owned 85% of the bank. Other
intermediaries whose performance according to the above-mentioned indicators was even poorer
were nationalized rather than liquidated. Nationalization was regarded as a better alternative,
avoiding the threat of a generalized bank run, and one that did not require immediate outlays.
58
                                               
58 Five banks were nationalized during this period:  Banco de Colombia,  Banco  del  Estado,  Banco de  Comercio,  Banco
Tequendama and  Banco de  los  Trabajadores. Many commercial financing companies were also intervened, with the
administration of the instituions handed over to the SB until their recovery.
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The fact that the SB's intervention in the financial sector is discretionary need not
necessarily be considered a weakness. There is little consensus regarding the preference for
discretion over rules within the context of banking supervision. Whereas rules impart clarity and
credibility they sacrifice flexibility. Discretion is by definition flexible and enhances the
regulator's ability to respond to specific situations, and to take into account "soft" indicators (e.g.
managerial quality) which help in making the decision as to which course of action is most
appropriate in a given case. However, the incentives for a Superintendent to take a timely
decision may be reduced if a lack of clear rules and thresholds for intervention is combined with
a lack of independence, as exemplified by the requirement for an approval by the Minister of
Finance of a Superintendent's decision to intervene.
   Figure 9
Public Banks: The Caja Agraria
Banco Nacional
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The Caja Agraria was created in 1931 and conceived as an institution with the mandate
to provide loans and general services to farmers as well as to supply them with agricultural
inputs. It was originally designed as a credit union with 25% of its equity held by the
government, 10% by commercial banks, 4% by the National Coffee Fund and the remainder by
its borrowers. The government later took over the institution.
59 A closer look at the monitoring
and control of the Caja Agraria by the SB serves to illustrate the lack of autonomous decision-
making power of the SB when it comes to government-owned institutions.
In its evaluation of Colombia’s financial sector, the World Bank (1992) points to major
problem areas of the Caja Agraria which were responsible for its constant financial losses.  High
on the list was the fact that arrears on the loan portfolio were very high and had reached over
20% of the portfolio while the banking sector as a whole averaged 5%. In 1988, for example,
arrears were at 34.2% yet the institution was not intervened.
60
In effect, an index of the portfolio quality of the Caja Agraria shows a sharp deterioration
in the quality of loans. In 1987, 5% of total loans were in arrears and by 1988 this percentage had
risen to 33% (Figure 10).  While an index of the  Caja’s capitalization does not indicate as
negative a situation as that of other banks which were intervened (Figure 11), an analysis of
these two indexes in conjunction with the Caja Agraria’s operational losses reveals (Figure 12)
that comparing the situation of the Caja with that of other intermediaries that were intervened,
the SB should have taken action long ago
61.
Of the twelve individuals interviewed, eight agreed that the case of the Caja Agraria was
a clear example the SB’s lack of autonomy from the government. An ex-superintendent indicated
that during his term there had been the intention, on different occasions, to intervene in the Caja
Agraria, but the governments political considerations interfered with the ability of the
Superintendent to act.  In its annual report in 1983, the then General Manager of the Caja Agraria
makes the following statement (our translation): “...the accumulated losses of the institution
reached such gravity that the SB notified us, in a communiqué on April 28th that: ‘It is important
to emphasize that losses amounting to C$16,609,939.075 [Colombian pesos] which represents
238.79% of capital and reserves, is sufficient cause for the dissolution of the Caja ...
62’” He
continues, “...given the situation, we appealed to the National Government, in search of the
necessary resources to confront the financial crisis. Unfortunately, the Government was not able
to provide these resources due to the difficult budgetary situation it was facing.  We had no other
alternative than to appeal directly to Congress in search of legal solutions. Fortunately, given the
long record of service by the Caja Agraria, we found a favorable atmosphere in Congress, which
                                               
59 World Bank, 1992.
60 Also, the  Caja’s non-banking activities were beyond the scope of operation of a banking institution, and its the total
administration costs of the bank were abnormally high due to a very costly pension plan, overstaffing and high salaries and
benefits.
61 In the evaluation of Colombia’s financial sector done by the World Bank in 1992, they report that the four major problems of
the Caja Agraria that produced constant financial losses were (1) loan arrears on the loan portfolio at the bank were very high and
had reached over 20% of the portfolio, while the banking sector averaged 5%. (In 1988 the arrears were of 34,2% and the
institution was not intervened). (2) The Caja’s non-banking activities were beyond the scope of operation of a banking institution
(3) the total administration costs of the bank were abnormally high due to a very costly pension plan, overstaffing and high
salaries and benefits.
62 This is according to  ordinal 2 of article 457 of the Code of Commerce, in accordance with the numeral 7  article 48 (Law 45
of 1923).43
went on to approve Law 68 of 1983, making the Government responsible of all losses




                                               
63 Informe de Labores. Caja Agraria  1982-1986. p. 11.
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In conclusion, the lack of formal and real autonomy with respect to the Government has
meant that the SB's performance has been compromised when its responsibility, in terms of
vigilance of the financial sector, is directly confronted with the Government's general economic
and political interests. Since, by definition, formal autonomy addresses independence from the
government, its absence has not affected the SB's fulfillment of its tasks with respect to the
private sector. Although this result is surprising due to the concentration of the sector, this
resilience to private pressure groups may be supported by two factors: the agency's clarity of
mandate, given that its sole responsibility is the monitoring an control of financial
intermediaries; and the apparent limited pressure of interest groups in the financial sector
lobbying for special favors. Nevertheless, the incentives for  timely action on the part of the
Superintendent appear to be weak.
In terms of independence from the government, the  Superintendency is a non-
autonomous institution, and its actions have reflected this status. The law reveals the clear
dependence of the SB with respect to the government, as represented by the Minister of Finance.
The Ministry supervises the performance of the SB and participates in the decision-making
process within the institution. The incentives created by this structure favor a Superintendent
who relies heavily on the opinions of the government when taking decisions.
6. Conclusions
Colombia’s existing financial regulatory and supervisory framework suffers from a
number of flaws. In our interviews many voiced the opinion that aspects of today’s institutional
structure should be changed. According to Table 7, most considered that the SB should remain
within the executive branch, while recognizing the need to grant the institution more autonomy
(budgetary and in terms of interventions). As for the optimal institutional structure for financial







































regulation within the executive branch; granting the Central Bank the faculty to set the rules; or
creating an autonomous board for banking regulation.
One of the flaws in Colombia’s regulatory structure is that there is little coordination
between the agencies that issue regulation for the sector, namely the Central Bank, the Ministry
of Finance, the SB, etc. (in spite of the fact that the Superintendent attends the Central Bank’s
Board meetings). In order to avoid duplication of efforts and to simplify the regulatory structure
it is desirable for all regulation to be grouped within a single institution. One possibility is the
creation of an autonomous board for banking regulation. The members of the board should
include the current actors: the Technical Vice Minister of Finance, the Technical Manager of the
Central Bank, as well as a number of full-time experts dedicated solely to the formulation of
rules and regulations. The Superintendent of Banks would be invited during the discussion of
regulations, although without the right to vote.  Such a board would need to be complemented by
a strong Superintendency monitoring and controlling the sector.
The SB should remain within the executive branch. Since it is the Government that must
inevitably finance the costs of bank interventions, either directly or through its ability to levy
taxes, there is a general acceptance regarding the desirability of maintaining the SB within the
executive branch.  Moreover, separating the SB from the executive would mean embarking on a
cumbersome process of institutional reform.
Nevertheless, the SB needs more autonomy from the Government. This can be achieved
by changing the way the Superintendent is elected and by granting the SB greater budgetary
autonomy. Separating the Superintendent’s term from that of the President is one means of
enhancing the former’s independence. The Superintendent should ideally be named for a fixed
period, of a length at least equal to that of the President (4 years). Staggering the Superintendent
and President’s terms would also highlight this separation. In other words, each President would
name a Superintendent only halfway through his period in office. The President’s ability to
dismiss the Superintendent at will should be abolished as it merely promotes shortsightedness
and underlines insecurity of tenure. In the naming of the Superintendent, further independence
from the executive would be achieved by distancing the President from the process.  An option is
for the President to present a short-list of candidates to the Board of the Central Bank, who
would make the final decision.
As for greater budgetary autonomy, each superintendent should have the ability to
manage the SB’s resources directly and not through the Finance Minister, as is the case today.
To maintain some oversight of the institution, the SB might be required to present each year’s
budget to the autonomous board of banking regulation for approval.
With such a structure, the ability of the government to unduly influence the SB’s
decisions would be reduced.  This would solve some important problems of the institution as it
stands today: its inability to act independently with respect to the government and the difficulties
of improving its technical capacity due to budgetary restrictions. The Government would
nevertheless still influence the general direction of the sector through the Technical  Vice
Minister of Finance and through its participation in the regulatory board.46
Table 7   Results of the Interviews (1)
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ex- Technical Vice Minister
Ex-Member of the Board of  Directors of the Central Bank
General Manager of the Central Bank47
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